The recently developed mean-field-game models of corruption  and botnet defense in cyber-security , along with the evolutionary game approach of inspection and corruption , can be combined under an extended setting including the pressure and resistance game element . We propose here a general framework for interaction in networks that includes binary interaction (the evolutionary game component), individual decision making inside the environment (the mean-field game component), the action of the principal or the major player (the pressure-resistance game component), and the noise. In order to perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model,
we suggest working in three asymptotic regimes; fast execution of personal decisions, small rates of binary interactions, and strong discounting in time.
 Kolokoltsov, V. (2014). The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.1269.
 Kolokoltsov, V. N., & Malafeyev, O. A. (2015). Mean-field-game model of corruption. arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.03240.
 Kolokoltsov, V. N., & Bensoussan, A. (2016). Mean-field-game model for Botnet defense in Cyber-security. Applied Mathematics & Optimization, 74(3), 669-692.
 Katsikas, S., Kolokoltsov, V., & Yang, W. (2016). Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games. Games, 7(4), 31.
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